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CONTRIBUTING TO DELINQUENCY: AN EXERCISE
IN JUDICIAL SPECULATION
I. INTRODUCTION
UVENILE DELINQUENCY, like many diseases, emanates from a complex
meshwork of causes, many of which are unidentified. The obvious, although
perhaps oversimplified, solution to prevent juvenile delinquency has been to
isolate and control through legislation some of its suspected causes. Many
of these enacted solutions, however, have failed to accomplish their intended
purpose.
In legislative efforts to protect minors from potentially corrupting adult
influences, the drafters went too far. They did not enact specific criminal
statutes, which would permit the prosecution of those who actively and
knowingly expose children to venal, immoral or perverted acts. Instead,
they have adopted criminal contributing statutes encompassing broadly
stated behavior for which a person may be prosecuted irrespective of any
prior notice as to the criminality of his or her conduct or influence. The real
victim in many prosecutions under contributing statutes has become the
accused and not the minor.
An overwhelming majority of states have statutes making it a criminal
offense to contribute to the delinquency of a minor. Although the statutes
have proved to be a fertile source for the prosecution of adults in a wide
variety of circumstances and relationships involving minors, the scope and
constitutional validity of such statutes have seldom been appraised.1 In the
wake of State v. Hodges,2 declaring the Oregon contributing statute' invalid
as being unconstitutionally vague, reappraisal is necessary.' Without consider-
ing, except as alluded to incidentally, the affect which marriage5 and the
reaching of statutory age limits6 have upon the status of a minor, the conceived
purpose, scope and application of contributing to delinquency statutes shall
be considered within the penumbra of the constitutional "void for vagueness"
doctrine.
1 See Gies, Contributing to Delinquency, 8 ST. Louis U.LJ. 59 (1963) [hereinafter cited as
Gies]; Comment, Contributing to Delinquency Statutes-An Ounce of Prevention?, 5
WELLAMET-rE L.J. 104 (1968) [hereinafter cited as An Ounce of Prevention].
2 254 Ore. 21, 457 P.2d 491 (1969). See also 15 VILL. L. REV. 767 (1970).
3 ORE. REV. STAT. § 167.210 (1968) (repealed 1971).
4 The State v. Hodges decision held that the Oregon statute was unconstitutional not only in
its failure to meet the demands of due process, but also in its prohibited delegation of legisla-
tive power to the judge and jury, contrary to Article 1, Section 21 of the Oregon Constitution.
254 Ore. at 28, 457 P.2d at 494.
5 See Annot., 14 A.L.R. 2d 336 (1950).
6 See Annot., 73 A.L.R. 2d 874 (1960).
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II. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
Although at common law minors were protected from certain specific
adult indiscretions,' the common law did not recognize a comprehensive
crime of contributing to the delinquency of a minor.8 It was not until 1903,
when Colorado enacted a law creating the crime of contributing to the
delinquency of a minor,9 that specific legislative endorsement was given to
the protection of juveniles from the corrupting influences of adults.
At the turn of the century which ushered in the contributing to
delinquency offense, children were fostered under the protection of the
state's police powers in an effort to prevent their exposure to corrupting
societal influences.1" The statutory design was an attempt to save children
from morally corrupting sectors of society until the children were able
to fend for themselves. The concept arose out of a public policy of preventing
delinquency. 1 The attitudes, assumptions and philosophies of the time were
influential in this development.
Initially the courts strictly construed the contributing to delinquency
statutes. 12 The statutes were constrained to cover as few persons and circum-
stances as the language would permit. It was not until the judiciary became
more receptive to the goals of the statutes that the breadth of the statutes
was expanded. With the approval of the courts, contributing to delinquency
came to be defined as "a broad term involving conduct toward a child in an
unlimited variety of ways which tends to produce or to encourage or to
continue conduct of the child which would amount to delinquent conduct"."
HI. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION AND SCOPE
Since the crime of contributing to the delinquency of a minor is a
statutory rather than a common law creation, the elemental particulars of
the crime are largely a matter of statutory construction. Therefore, in order
to evaluate the offense in light of void for vagueness arguments,' it is
7 See Gies, supra note I, at 62 & n. 14 for an historical analysis of contributing to delinquency
legislation.
8 Love v. State, 211 Miss. 606, 52 So. 2d 470, 471 (1951); State v. Dunn, 53 Ore. 304, 99 P.
278 (1909); State v. Williams, 73 Wash. 678, 132 P. 415, 416 (1913).
9 Law of March 7, 1903, ch. 94, Colo. Sess. Laws 198.
10 See generally Gibson v. People, 44 Colo. 600, 99 P. 333 (1909).
"I See People v. Cohen, 62 Cal. App. 521, 526, 217 P. 78, 80 (1923); State v. Adams, 95
Wash. 189, 163 P. 403, 405 (1917).
12 See Gies, supra note 1, at 63.
Is Commonwealth v. Stroik, 175 Pa. Super. 10, 15, 102 A.2d 239, 241 (1954).
','See Collings, Unconstitutional Uncertainty-An Appraisal, 40 CORNELL L. Q. 195 (1955),
in which the author discusses four rationales that the courts have used in their refusal to find
a statute unconstitutionally vague: first, a construction of the statute in such a way that
uncertainty may be avoided; secondly, finding a requirement of intent which would clarify the
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essential that the crime, its language, and its elements be at least summarily
reviewed.
A. The Offense Defined
The offense of contributing to the delinquency of a minor has generally
been designated as a misdemeanor. 5 In at least one jurisdiction, however,
a violation of a contributing statute has been designated as a felony.'" The
penalties for a violation of a particular state's statute likewise varies with
the jurisdiction." Therefore, a conviction on a contributing charge is
dependent primarily upon the language of the particular statute under which
an accused is prosecuted.
Many jurisdictions have wrestled with the statutory language providing
punishment for "anyone" or any "person" who contributes to the delinquency
of a child.'" The contributing to delinquency statutes have been construed to be
employed against parents," persons who stand in loco parentis to the minor
with direct legal responsibility for the child's welfare,2" as well as against
persons who are legal strangers to the minor.2' With few exceptions, it has
been generally held that a minor cannot be found guilty of contributing to
the delinquency of another minor.22
The philosophical justification for the enactment of contributing statutes
appears to be the punishment of negligent parents in order to encourage a
more protective attitude toward their children and to discourage other
crime; thirdly, discovering external standards which clarify the statute; and finally, comparing
the statute with other statutes earlier declared constitutionally certain.
15 See, e.g., Smithson v. State, 34 Ala. App. 343, 39 So. 2d 678 (1949); People v. Wortman,
137 Cal. App. 339, 30 P.2d 565 (1934); Broadstreet v. State, 208 Miss. 789, 45 So. 2d 590
(1950); State v. Montalbo, 33 N.J. Super. 462, 110 A.2d 572 (Hudson County Ct. 1954);
State v. Rose, 89 Ohio St. 383, 106 N.E. 50 (1914); State v. Clevenger, 161 Wash. 306, 296 P.
1054 (1931).
16 State v. McKinley, 53 N.M. 106, 202 P.2d 964 (1949); cf. United States v. Meyers, 143
F. Supp. 1 (D. Alaska 1956).
27 Compare Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.99 (Page Supp. 1974) (which provides for a
maximum penalty of $1,000 or 6 months imprisonment or both), with N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 40A-6-3 (1972) (which provides for a maximum penalty of $5,000 or 5 years imprisonment
in the penitentiary or both).
18 See, e.g., Zambrotto v. Jannette, 290 N.Y.S. 338, 160 Misc. 558 (Dom. Rel. Ct. 1936);
State v. Hutchison, 222 Ore. 533, 353 P.2d 1047, 1053 (1960); Commonwealth v. Jordan,
136 Pa. Super. 242, 7 A.2d 523 (1939); Winters v. State, 139 Tex. Crim. 328, 139 S.W.2d
789 (1940).
19 See, e.g., State v. Scallan, 201 La. 1026, 10 So. 2d 885 (1942).
2 0 See, e.g., Sass v. People, 48 Colo. 125, 109 P. 263 (1910); People v. Lee, 226 I11. 148, 107
N.E. 112 (1914).
21 See, e.g., People v. Miller, 145 Cal. App. 2d 473, 302 P.2d 603 (1956); State v. Plastino,
67 Wash. 374, 121 P. 851 (1912).
22 See, e.g., Harris v. Souder, 233 bi, 287, 119 N.E.2d 8 (1954); State v. Iverson, 231 Ore.
15? 19, 371 P,2 §72, 674 (1962),
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parents from the dereliction of their parental duties. Since the culpability
of parental misguidance under contributing statutes has been adequately
discussed in several recent articles,2" emphasis will be placed on the application
of contributing statutes against adults as a class.
B. Mens Rea As An Element
Despite the traditional view that mens rea, or criminal intent, is an
essential element of a criminal offense, many jurisdictions do not require
mens rea as an essential element of the crime of contributing to the
delinquency of a minor.2 The reasons for this apparent contradiction vary
with the jurisdiction. It has been stated that an accused engages in relations
with a minor at his peril;25 that requiring intent would erect a barrier which
would defeat the enforcement of the contributing statute;
26 and that an act
made unlawful on the basis of public policy requires no showing of intent."'
Some courts, however, in order to clarify the crime in the face of void for
vagueness attacks, have found a requirement of intent whenever either a
derivative of the word "wilful" appears in the statute,2
8 or the accused
demonstrates knowledge of facts which should cause the defendant to believe
that his or her conduct was illicit. 9
Such an awareness of wrongdoing or knowledge of the facts making
the act unlawful, however, are only occasionally considered as elements
of the crime of contributing to the delinquency of a minor and, therefore,
need not be proved to obtain a conviction under a contributing statute.
2
23 See generally S. RUBNnr, CRIME AND JUVENILE DELINQUENCY, ch. 2 (3rd ed. 1970) [herein-
after cited as Rubin]; Kenny & Kenny, Shall We Punish the Parents?, 47 A.B.A.J. 804
(1961); Shong, The Legal Responsibility of Parents for Their Children's Delinquency,
6 FAM. L. Q. 145 (1972); Note, Criminal Liability of Parents for Failure to Control Their
Children, 6 VAL. L. REV. 332, 334-37 (1972).
24 See, e.g., Anderson v. State, 384 P.2d 669, 672 (Alaska 1963); State v. Hardy, 232 La. 920,
95 So. 2d 449 (1957); State v. Sobelman, 199 Minn. 232, 271 N.W. 484 (1937); State v.
Johnson, 88 N.W.2d 209 (N.D. 1958); State v. Hoffman, 236 Ore. 98, 385 P.2d 741, 743
(1963). See generally Annot., 31 A.L.R. 3d 848 (1970), suggesting that irrespective of the
view held in the jurisdiction, the practitioner should defend on the basis of a lack of mens
rea to commit the offense and insist that mens rea be proved by the state as an element of
the offense. Additionally, counsel should protect the record and preserve the issue for appeal.
In some jurisdictions, the practitioner may even present the lack of a requisite mens rea with
a view toward mitigation of punishment.
2 5 See Anderson v. State, 384 P.2d 669 (Alaska 1963); State v. Kominis, 73 Ohio App. 204,
55 N.E.2d 344 (1943). But cf. State v. Friedman, 35 Ohio Op. 39, 74 N.E.2d 285 (C.P. 1947).
20 See People v. Reznick, 75 Cal. App. 2d 832, 171 P.2d 952 (1946).
27 See Territory v. Delos Santos, 42 Hawaii 102 (1957).
28 See, e.g., Slaughter v. District of Columbia, 134 A.2d 338 (D.C. Mun. Ct. App. 1957);
State v. Bullins, 226 N.C. 142, 36 S.E.2d 915 (1946).
2 9 See, e.g., State v. Cutshaw, 7 Ariz. App. 210, 437 P.2d 962 (1968).
0 See, e.g., Pittman v. State, 43 Ala. App. 683, 199 So.2d 698 (1967); Marsh v. State, 104
Ind. App. 377, 8 N.E.2d 121 (1937); Wright v. State, 86 Tex, Crim. 434, 217 S.W. 15Z
(1919); State v, Westfall, 126 W. Va. 476, 29 S.E.2d 6 (1944),
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In the case of In re Lewis,3 for example, a bowling alley proprietor was
convicted of contributing to the delinquency of a fifteen year old employee
who was employed without working papers. The conviction rested on the
fact that the boy, so employed, was thus enabled to see where money was
kept and consequently succumbed to the temptation to steal.
Similarly, only a few jurisdictions have required the prosecution to
show that the accused knew the victim to be a minor in order to obtain a
conviction.32 In the California Court of Appeals decision of People v.
Reznick, a hotel clerk was successfully prosecuted under a contributing
statute for permitting a minor to be registered and to spend the night in the
hotel with a sailor who was not her husband. Although the hotel clerk
inquired and was informed that the sailor and the minor were married, he
had failed to ask the age of the minor. The California Court of Appeals
held that ignorance of the actual age of the minor was no defense.
C. Causing or Tending to Cause Delinquency: The Ohio Model
In a majority of jurisdictions it is not necessary to present evidence
that the minor has in fact become a delinquent in order to secure a conviction
for contributing to the delinquency of a minor.3" In these jurisdictions, the
minor's subsequent delinquency is not an essential element of the crime."
These statutes, either impliedly or by express language, have been construed
to penalize acts which may only have a tendency to cause or encourage
delinquency.3" However, in most jurisdictions even the final effect on the
child of the conduct charged as contributing to the delinquency of the minor
is not relevant in determining the guilt or innocence of the accused." It is
the category of behavior which appears to be punished rather than the
specific instance of conduct. The only causative element necessarily required
is that the proscribed act be committed in the presence of the minor."
While it is generally held that it is neither necessary to allege nor prove
31 193 Misc. 676, 84 N.Y.S.2d 790 (Child. Ct. 1948).
32 See, e.g., Chambers v. State, 247 Ind. 445, 215 N.E.2d 544 (1966); Gottlieb v. Common-
wealth, 126 Va. 807, 101 S.E. 872 (1920). Contra, Commonwealth v. Sarricks, 161 Pa. Super,
577, 56 A.2d 323 (1948); Jung v. State, 55 Wis. 2d 714, 201 N.W.2d 58 (1972).
3a 75 Cal. App. 2d 832, 171 P.2d 952 (1946).
34 See, e.g., State v. Locks, 94 Ariz. 134, 382 P.2d 241 (1963); Roach v. State, 222 Ark. 738,
262 S.W.2d 647 (1953); People v. Norris, 254 Cal. App. 2d 296, 62 Cal. Rptr. 66 (1967);
Fletcher v. State, 256 Md. 310, 260 A.2d 34 (1970); State v. Blount, 60 N.J. 23, 286 A.2d 36
(1972); Commonwealth v. Marlin, 452 Pa. 380, 305 A.2d 14 (1973). See also Note, 4
ARK. L. Rv. 477 (1950), which reviews conflicting court decisions on this issue.
85 See generally Annot., 18 A.L.R. 3d 824, 827 (1968).
36 Id.
37 See generally authorities cited notes 34 & 35 supra.
31 See, e.g., People v, Bernstein, 51 Cal. 2d 655, 335 P.2d 669, 671 (1959).
[Vol. 9:3
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that the minor has actually become a delinquent, the Ohio contributing
statute and the cases interpreting it have attempted to make a distinction
between actually contributing to delinquency and engaging in conduct which
could merely tend to cause delinquency. Ohio Revised Code Section 2151.418'
provides in pertinent part:
No person shall abuse a child or aid, abet, induce, cause, encourage,
or contribute to the dependency, neglect, unruliness, or delinquency of
a child or ward of the juvenile court, or act in a way tending to cause
delinquency or unruliness in such child.
Whenever an accused has been charged under the statute with "contributing
to delinquency" the minor's actual delinquency must be shown."° When the
accused has been charged with acting "in a way tending to cause delinquency",
however, a showing of actual delinquency is unnecessary. "1 The Ohio
Supreme Court decisions of State v. Miclau"2 and State v. Gans," provide
the best illustration of the statutory distinction made under the Ohio
contributing statute.
In State v. Miclau, the police had been informed that a fifteen year
old and two companions had been served intoxicating liquor at a
local restaurant. The police enlisted the co-operation of the minor and the
informant adult (a friend of the minor's) to order intoxicating liquor from
an employee of the accused restaurant manager. Since the liquor was
immediately confiscated by police officers, the minor was held not to have
committed an act of delinquency, having neither purchased nor imbibed
the liquor. The restaurant manager's conviction was reversed on the basis
that the element of delinquency was not established. Therefore, in Ohio
when an accused is charged with contributing to the delinquency of a minor,
the delinquency of the minor is a fact to be established as is any other
39 Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.41 (Page Supp. 1974). Rather than restrict the scope of the
Ohio contributing statute, the Ohio legislature in 1969 amended this section to encompass the
broad term "unruliness" as a further aspect of the crime of contributing to the delinquency
of a minor.
40See Fisher v. State, 84 Ohio St. 360, 95 N.E. 908 (1911). However, in State ex. rel. Meng
v. Todaro, 161 Ohio St. 348, 119 N.E.2d 281, 282 (1954), the Ohio Supreme Court held
that:
a finding or adjudication in a separate proceeding that a minor is delinquent is
not a condition precedent to the maintenance of a prosecution for contributing to the
delinquency of a minor, where the affidavit filed against the one charged with contributing
to the delinquency and the evidence on his trial shows that the minor is delinquent.
41 See State v. Clark, 92 Ohio App. 382, 110 N.E.2d 433 (1952).
42 167 Ohio St. 38, 146 N.E.2d 293 (1957).
4, 168 Ohio St. 174, 151 N.E.2d 709 (1958). See also 5 How. LJ. 120 (1959); 35 N. D.
L. REV. 166 (1959).
COMMENTWinter, 19761
6
Akron Law Review, Vol. 9 [1976], Iss. 3, Art. 4
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol9/iss3/4
AKRON LAW REVIEW
necessary element in a criminal prosecution. The contributing act must
result in a direct outpouring of delinquent behavior."
In State v. Gans, the parents of an eleven year old girl, who transported
her to West Virginia and consented to her marriage there, were found
guilty of acting in a way tending to cause the delinquency of their child.
The decision held that the purpose of the latter portion of the Ohio statute
is to prevent delinquency "rather than to await such delinquency and then
punish the adult offender". 5 The Ohio Supreme Court observed that the
child's marriage was contrary to public policy as reflected in Ohio's marriage
statutes, and that such conduct could result in the child's becoming a truant
from school or in the endangering of the morals of her fellow classmates.
It has been further argued as a justification for the language, "acting
in a way tending to cause delinquency", that "no legislator could conceivably
be expected to anticipate all the acts that could reasonably be expected to
cause the delinquency of any given juvenile."" However, in his dissent in
Gans"7 Justice Taft decried the majority's application of this clause as
"imaginative speculation". In applying the clause to arrive at the Gans
decision, Justice Taft argued that the majority found it necessary to "stretch
the words" of the contributing statute "as far as they will reasonably go, and
apparently even much farther, in a direction away from that called for by
the elementary rule of strict construction of penal statutes", in order to
discover any trace of delinquency."
Despite the apparent exactitude in the Ohio legal distinction regarding
the offenses of contributing to the delinquency of a minor or acting in a way
tending to cause delinquency, the distinction may be without a difference. "9
44 See Fisher v. State, 84 Ohio St. 360, 95 N.E. 908 (1911), where it was stated that without
evidence in the record of the actual conviction of the minor as a delinquent, the charge of
contributing to delinquency must fail no matter how culpable the accused's acts may have
been. The rationale appears to have been that if a child had not become a delinquent, an
accused could not have contributed to the delinquency. In order to avoid this problem of
proof, in 1913, the second clause of Omo REV. CODE § 2151.41 was enacted.
45 168 Ohio St. 174, 176, 151 N.E.2d 709, 710 (1958).
46 State v. Crary, 10 Ohio Op. 2d 36, 38, 155 N.E.2d 262, 264 (C. P. 1959).
47 168 Ohio St. 174, 184, 151 N.E.2d 709, 715 (1958) (Taft, J., dissenting).
48 Id. at 185, 151 N.E.2d at 716.
49 At least one Ohio court has affirmed a conviction where the accused was charged in the
alternative with violating both provisions of the Ohio contributing statute. With circuitous
legal reasoning an Ohio court of appeals in State v. Hannawalt, 26 Ohio L. Abs. 641
(Ct. App. 1938), upon evidence that the accused committed an act of forcible rape upon the
minor, found the accused guilty of acting in a way tending to contribute to the girl's
delinquency. The court noted that the minor quit her employment as a result of the publicized
misfortune and might suffer a possible loss of her self-respect. The court further conceded
that if the minor consented to sexual intercourse, as alleged by the accused, such consent
would constitute an act of immoral conduct which would define her as a delinquent. The
[Vol. 9:3
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Since the penalty for either offense is the same,50 the prosecutor may
circumvent the strict requirements involved in an allegation of the former
offense by merely alleging the latter; that is, that the accused has acted in
a way tending to cause delinquency. The implication is that Miclau might
have been decided differently if the accused restaurant manager had been
charged with acting in a way tending to cause delinquency.
In State v. Hodges," the Oregon Supreme Court considered catch-all
language in that state's contributing statute5 2 which provided:
When a child is a delinquent child as defined by any statute of this
state, . . . any person who does any act which manifestly tends to cause
any child to become a delinquent child, shall be punished upon
conviction .... (emphasis added)
Although the Oregon courts had previously upheld the contributing statute
against other void for vagueness challenges,5" this clause of the statute was
declared void on its face by the Oregon Supreme Court because it contained
no standards by which a jury could determine guilt. The last clause of the
Ohio contributing statute" is strikingly similar to the now unconstitutional
Oregon statute. Yet, despite the fact that a person may be convicted in Ohio
for tending to cause delinquency even absent a showing of resultant
delinquency, the constitutionality of the Ohio statute has been upheld
against void for vagueness arguments.5
In a 1959 article appraising the Ohio contributing statute and other
Ohio statutes involving charges against adult offenders,"
0 Judge Don J.
Young, Jr. began:
It is true, of course, that the Ohio statutes on this subject are so
accused would then, by his own admission, be guilty of contributing to the delinquency of
the minor.
50 OHno REv. CODE ANN. § 2151.99 (Page Supp. 1974), which makes a conviction of either
offense a first degree misdemeanor. See note 17 supra.
5' 254 Ore. 21, 457 P.2d 491 (1969).
52 ORE. REv. STAT. § 167.210 (1968) (repealed 1971).
53 See, e.g., State v. Gordineer, 229 Ore. 105, 366 P.2d 161 (1961); State v. Harmon, 225
Ore. 571, 358 P.2d 1048 (1961); State v. Peebler, 200 Ore. 321, 265 P.2d 1081 (1954); State
v. Stone, 111 Ore. 227, 226 P. 430 (1924).
54The last clause of Omo REv. CODE § 2151.41 provides in pertinent part: "No person
shall . . . act in a way tending to cause delinquency or unruliness in . . . [a] child."
5 See State v. Poney, 19 Ohio Misc. 51, 48 Ohio Op. 208 (Juv. Ct. 1966); State v. Coterel,
97 Ohio App. 48, 123 N.E.2d 438 (1953), appeal dismissed, 162 Ohio St. 112, 120 N.E.2d
590 (1954). State v. Coterel upheld the constitutionality of the prior contributing statute:
Law of April 29, 1937, 117 Laws of Ohio 534, as amended, OIno REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.41
(Page Supp. 1974).
56 Young, Charges Against Adult Offenders in the Juvenile Court, 32 OHIo BAR 224
(Nov. 11, 1959).
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broad that there is usually very little question as to whether or not
they have been violated.57
There is little question in the opinion of this writer that, under the constitu-
tional standards to be recited below, the above stated clause of Section
2151.41 of the Ohio Revised Code is void for vagueness. Other states'
contributing statutes may be prone to similar attacks for vagueness.
IV. THE VOID FOR VAGUENESS DOCTRINE
A. In General: The Standards
As enunciated by the United States Supreme Court, an individual has
a constitutional right to be warned of what may constitute criminal conduct."
This constitutional right attaches so that an individual need not speculate
as to the meaning and boundaries of a statute prescribing penalties for
stated conduct. That a criminal statute shall not be uncertain or vague is
implicit in the sixth amendment right "to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation" and in the due process clauses of the fifth and
fourteenth amendments. 59
Whether a criminal statute is void for vagueness depends in part upon
the rights involved and upon statutory construction. Under the rule of
Thornhill v. Alabama,6" an attempt will not be made to narrow the
application of a statute normally impinging upon first amendment or
other fundamental rights in order to save its constitutionality. However,
under the rule of United States v. National Dairy Products Corp.,61 where
fundamental rights are not involved, the courts will consider a challenged
statute as restricted to its factual application in an effort to save its
constitutionality. Therefore, whether a criminal statute is void for vagueness
is a question of degree. Although some vagueness may be tolerated in a
57 Id.
58See e.g., Giaccio v. Pennsylvania, 382 U.S. 399 (1966); Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360
(1964); Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451 (1939); McBoyle v. United States, 283
U.S. 25, 27 (1931). See generally Collings, Unconstitutional Uncertainty-An Appraisal,
40 CORNELL L. Q. 195 (1955); Note, Void for Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court,
109 PA. L. REv. 67 (1960).
5 9 See, e.g., United States v. L. Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U.S. 81, 89-93 (1921), in which
the Lever Act § 4, 40 Stat. 276 (1917), re-enacted as Act of October 22, 1919, ch. 80, § 2,
41 Stat. 297, was held to violate U.S. CONST. amends. V and VI, which require an ascertainable
standard of guilt to be fixed by Congress rather than by courts and juries; McSurely v. Ratliff,
282 F. Supp. 848, 851 (D.C. Ky. 1967), appeal dismissed, 390 U. S. 412 (1967), in which
the court applied U.S. CONST. amends. VI and XIV to hold invalid that section of the
Kentucky Sedition law under which a person could be indicted for suggesting constitutional
change "by means other than lawful means", since what constituted "lawful means" was left
to the discretion of the judge.
60 310 U.S. 88 (1940); cf. United States v. Petrillo, 332 U.S. 1, 9-12 (1947).
61 372 U.S. 29, 33 (1963).
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criminal statute, the statute creating the offense must be sufficiently explicit
to inform those who may be subject to it of the particular conduct on their
part which will render them liable to its penalties.
A criminal statute must fail, as applied against an accused, if when
tested under due process standards it:
(a) fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his
or her contemplated conduct is forbidden by the statute," or
(b) encourages arbitrary and erratic arrests and convictions."
The void for vagueness doctrine has recently been applied by the
United States Supreme Court to strike down a vagrancy ordinance in
Papachristou v. Jacksonville.6" The Court based its decision on the grounds,
in addition to the above stated standards, that the ordinance made criminal,
activities which by modem standards are normally innocent, and also
placed unfettered discretion in the hands of the police. The application of
these standards to an evaluation of contributing to delinquency statutes
betrays the uncertainty upon which such statutes thrive.
B. As Applied to Contributing Statutes
The United States Supreme Court has yet to rule upon the constitution-
ality of a contributing to delinquency statute.65 Of those states which have
considered the constitutionality of such statutes, however, four have declared
aspects of the legislation unconstitutional." The initial impetus for these
62 United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612 (1954).
63Thorhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940); Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242 (1937).
64 405 U.S. 156 (1972).
65 See, e.g., Etherton v. United States, 249 F.2d 410 (9th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 355
U.S. 919 (1958); Brockmueller v. State, 86 Ariz. 82, 340 P.2d 992 (1959), cert, denied,
361 U.S. 913 (1959); Dokes v. State, 241 Ark. 720, 409 S.W.2d 827 (1966), cert. denied,
389 U.S. 901 (1967); State v. Vachon, 306 A.2d 781 (N.H. 1973), rev'd on other grounds,
414 U.S. 478 (1974); State v. Gans, 168 Ohio St. 174, 151 N.E.2d 709 (1958), cert. denied
359 U.S. 945 (1959); Commonwealth v. Randall, 183 Pa. Super. 603, 133 A.2d 276, cert.
denied, 355 U.S. 954 (1957); State ex. rel. Shoreline School Dist. 412 v. Superior Court, 55
Wash. 2d 177, 346 P.2d 999 (1959), cert. denied, 363 U.S. 814 (1960).
66 Stone v. State, 220 Ind. 165, 41 N.E.2d 609 (1942); State v. Vallery, 212 La. 1095, 34
So. 2d 329 (1948); State v. Hodges, 254 Ore. 21, 457 P.2d 491 (1969); State v. Gallegos,
384 P.2d 967 (Wyo. 1963). In State v. Vallery the Supreme Court of Louisiana reviewed the
section of its criminal code in which contributing to the delinquency of a juvenile was
defined as:
mhe intentional enticing, aiding or permitting, by anyone over the age of seventeen,
of any child under the age of seventeen, and no exception shall be made for a child who
may be emancipated by marriage or otherwise, to:
(7) Perform any sexually immoral act .... LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14:92 (West 1974).
Due to the failure of the Louisiana legislature to define with precision the conduct sought
to be prohibited, the court held that the indefiniteness and uncertainty as to what constituted
"immoral acts" rendered this section of the act void.
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constitutional attacks on the contributing statutes originated in the United
States Supreme Court opinion of Musser v. Utah,"7 in which a Utah statute
proscribing "acts injurious to the public morals" was held unconstitutional,
as being in violation of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.
Of the states which have considered void for vagueness challenges to
contributing statutes and have found such statutes to be valid,"8 few, if any,
have reconsidered and reassessed their contributing statutes since the Hodges
decision. One commentator has stated that:
It is evident from the cases decided to date that the state courts
have felt that the policy to prevent delinquency which lies behind the
contributing statutes and the purpose to protect children, weigh much
heavier on their scales than any unfairness or deprivation of liberty
that may result from vague and imprecise language.69
In upholding the constitutionality of contributing statutes against
attacks charging void for vagueness, state court decisions have expressed
a rationale similar to that stated in State v. McKinley."0 In that decision the
New Mexico Supreme Court stated:
The ways and means by which the venal mind may corrupt and
debauch the youth of our land, both male and female, are so
multitudinous that to compel a complete enumeration in any statute
designed for the protection of the young before giving it validity would
be to confess the inability of modern society to cope with juvenile
delinquency. 1
In State v. Gallegos the Supreme Court of Wyoming reviewed its Child Protection Act
which provides in pertinent part:
It shall be unlawful for any person (including but not limited to parent, guardian, or
custodian) knowingly to commit any of the following acts with respect to a child under
the age of 19 years:
(d) to cause, encourage, aid or contribute to the endangering of the child's health,
welfare or morals. Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 14-23 (1965).
The court held the provision to violate due process, as it furnished no standard as to
what constituted endangering of a child's health, welfare or morals.
67 333 U.S. 95 (1947).
68 See, e.g., United States v. Meyers, 143 F. Supp. 1 (D. Alaska 1956); Brockmueller v.
State, 86 Ariz. 82, 340 P.2d 992 (1959); State v. Barone, 124 So.2d 490 (Fla. 1960);
McDonald v. Commonwealth, 331 S.W.2d 716 (Ky. 1960); State v. Fulmer, 250 La. 29, 193
So. 2d 774 (1967); State v. Simants, 182 Neb. 491, 155 N.W.2d 788 (1968); State v.
Montalbo, 33 N.J. Super. 462, 110 A.2d 572 (Hudson County Ct. 1954); State v. Koessler,
58 N.H. 102, 266 P.2d 351 (1954); Commonwealth v. Randall, 183 Pa. Super. 603, 133
A.2d 276 (1957); State v. Tritt, 23 Utah 2d 365, 463 P.2d 806 (1970); State v. Friedlander,
141 Wash. 1, 250 P. 453 (1926); Jung v. State, 55 Wis. 2d 714, 201 N.W.2d 58 (1972).69 An Ounce of Prevention, supra note 1, at 119 & n. 101.
70 53 N.M. 106, 202 P.2d 964 (1949).
71Id. at 111, 202 P.2d at 967.
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Despite extensive legislative and judicial experience with contributing
statutes, courts have similarly protested attacks on their constitutionality,
and the broad statutes have remained virtually unchanged, neither detailing
nor encompassing the particular acts which court cases have determined
to be the actual offenses.
Although a stated crime may generally acquire definiteness from a
course of judicial construction, this has not been the case with the contributing
to delinquency offense. The particular conduct prohibited under contributing
to delinquency statutes varies greatly from statute to statute. The various
jurisdictions have left initial determinations to both arresting officers and
prosecutors, and final determinations to both the jury and the juvenile
court, as to whether the particular conduct of an accused is criminal under
a state contributing statute."2 If there is a basic fallacy to the concept of
contributing to delinquency statutes, it is that the broad unspecified actions
of an adult, which are found to be criminal only through a final determina-
tion by judge and jury, could have been foreseen by the accused to have
criminal consequences, resulting from its probable immoral influence on a
minor.
In Stone v. State,' the Indiana Supreme Court, without dissent,
examined that state's contributing statute"4 and found it void for vagueness.
In a discussion of its rationale the Indiana court elaborated on the void for
72 See, e.g., People v. Diebert, 117 Cal. App. 2d 410, 256 P.2d 355 (1953); MODEL PENAL
CODE § 207.13, Comment (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959) wherein it is stated:
The basic error that appears to account for the prevalence of the legislation here disap-
proved is the assumption that the comprehensive terms in which jurisdiction is commonly
conferred upon juvenile courts over 'delinquent, dependent or neglected' children are
also appropriate to define a criminal offense. It is one thing to give broad scope to an
authority to promote the welfare of children, but quite another thing to give a criminal
court equivalent latitude in defining crimes for which adults shall be punished.
73220 Ind. 165, 41 N.E.2d 609 (1942).
74 The Indiana contributing statute reviewed in Stone v. State provided in pertinent part:
It shall be unlawful for any adult to commit any act or omission which would in any
way encourage or tend to cause any child to come within the provisions of this act or
to counsel or encourage any child to commit any of the acts specified in Sec. 5,
subsection A of this act . . . . Law of March 13, 1941, ch. 233, § 18, [1941] Ind.
Acts 913.
Section 5 of subsection A provided in part:
Sec. 5. (A) Jurisdiction. The court shall have exclusive jurisdiction in proceedings
concerning any child living or found in the county:
(1) Who has violated any law of the state or any ordinance or regulation of a
subdivision of the state.
(2) Who by reason of being wayward or habitually disobedient is uncontrolled by
his parent, guardian, or custodian.
(3) Who is habitually truant from school or home.
(4) Who is habitually or so conducts himself as to injure or endanger the morals
of himself or others. Law of March 13, 1941, ch. 233, § 5 [1941] Ind. Acts 904.
For the current Indiana statute see IND. ANN. STAT. § 10-812 (Burns 1956).
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vagueness standards as applied to the 1941 act:
To construe the statute as literally intended to provide punishment
by imprisonment for counseling or encouraging any or every isolated
act, which might tend in the slightest degree to encourage conduct upon
the part of a child which might bring it within the jurisdiction of the
juvenile court, or within the provisions of subsection (A) of section 5,
would result in punishing as a crime many acts or omissions so trivial
in themselves that it cannot be rationally concluded that it was intended
that they should be made criminal. There is nothing in the act to indicate
where the line is to be drawn between trivial and substantial things.
It must be left to the judgment of each trial judge who is required to
pass upon the sufficiency of affidavits or indictments. Such a statute is
clearly bad for uncertainty."
It is difficult if not impossible under most contributing statutes to define
the particular acts which cause or tend to cause delinquency of a minor since
the statutes treat all offenders in one class. As has been demonstrated,
notice of the specific acts in reference to minors which would subject an
adult to a prosecution for contributing to delinquency can be garnered
only by viewing the cases which have arisen under the broad terms of the
statutes. In analyzing such cases it has been suggested that:
First, there are acts which are not considered crimes in themselves,
however meretricious they may be, but which become crimes because
of real or imputed consequences which they do or may bring about ....
In the second class are offenses which might otherwise have been tried
under more specific provisions of the criminal code, rather than as
contributing offenses.7
Of paramount concern is the fact that contributing statutes are generally
invoked in situations specifically dealt with by other penal statutes.
Despite the existence of these specifically applicable statutes, which generally
provide for more stringent penalties, contributing to delinquency statutes
have most often been used in two areas: first, to convict adults for sexual
misconduct with or in the presence of a minor" and secondly, for furnishing
a minor with intoxicating liquor.78 Since conduct of this nature is specifically
prohibited by statute, the contributing to delinquency statute has become
merely a lesser charge under which the perpetrator may be punished. The
75 Stone v. State, 220 Ind. 165, 175, 41 N.E.2d 609, 613 (1942).
76 Gies, supra note 1, at 68.
7 See generally Annot., 31 A.L.R. 3d 848 (1970); Annot., 18 A.L.R. 3d 824 (1968) (where
a compilation of cases supporting this proposition is provided).
78 Id.
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charge of contributing to the delinquency of a minor has served also as
either a convenient catch-all offense or a lesser offense to which one can
plea bargain.
Although the list is not intended to be inclusive, adults have been
convicted under contributing statutes for encouraging a minor to leave home;"
9
encouraging or permitting the minor to enter a tavern,
80 dance hall," or
poolroom;" marrying a minor;" giving, selling, or prescribing dangerous
drugs to a minor; " instructing a minor not to salute the flag;
80 causing or
encouraging a minor to associate with immoral persons;" encouraging a
minor to take part in a protest;"? and for failure of a divorced husband to make
support payments under a court decree. While it is difficult to perceive
criminal culpability in many of these activities, those that are culpable could
easily have been prosecuted under the detailed prohibitions of other specific
legislative enactments contained in other sections of a state's penal code.
The danger exists that the crime of contributing to the delinquency
of a minor has become a means of avoiding the burden of proof required
to be met under these other statutes dealing with specific criminal offenses.
8
"
70 See, e.g., People v. Calkins, 48 Cal. App. 2d 33, 119 P.2d 142 (1941); People v. Hall,
55 M. App. 2d 113, 204 N.E.2d 40 (1965); People v. Owens, 13 Mich. App. 469 164 N.W.2d
712 (1968); State v. Harris, 105 W. Va. 165, 141 S.E. 637 (1928).
80 See e.g., State v. Hardy, 232 La. 920, 95 So. 2d 499 (1957); State v. Scallan, 201 La. 1026,
10 So. 2d 885 (1942) (where a father was convicted of violating the contributing statute for
permitting his child to enter a nightclub); State v. Sobelman, 199 Minn. 232, 271 N.W. 484
(1937).
81 See, e.g., State v. Rosenfield, 111 Minn. 301, 126 N.W. 1068 (1910); State v. Johnson,
88 N.W.2d 209 (N.D. 1958).
82 See, e.g., Anss v. State, 16 Ohio App. 502 (1922).
83 See generally Annot., 68 A.L.R. 2d 745 (1959).
84 See People v. DePaula, 43 Cal. 2d 643, 276 P.2d 600 (1954) (where the court stated
as dictum that the use of a minor to transport narcotics contributes to the delinquency of the
minor); State v. Tritt, 23 Utah 2d. 365, 463 P.2d 806 (1970). See generally Annot., 36
A.L.R. 3d 1292 (1971).
85 See, e.g., State v. Davis, 58 Ariz. 444, 120 P.2d 808 (1942), cert. denied, 319 U.S.
775 (1943). Defendants, Jehovah's Witnesses, taught, instructed, and directed their children
to refuse to salute the flag while attending public school. It was alleged that the defendants
knew that their children would be expelled upon their refusal to salute the flag. The effect of
such cases was reversed when the United States Supreme Court held in Board of Education
v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) that compulsary flag salute statutes are unconstitutional;
cf. People v. Chiafreddo, 381 111. 214, 44 N.E.2d 888 (1942); Partain v. State, 77 Okla.
Crim. 270, 141 P.2d 124 (1943) (both decided after Barnette).
86 See, e.g., State v. Johnson, 145 S.W.2d 468 (Mo. App. 1940).
87 See, e.g., Hubbard v. Commonwealth, 207 Va. 673, 152 S.E.2d 250 (1967).
8 8 See, e.g., Bradley v. Commonwealth, 380 S.W.2d 211 (Ky. 1964).
89 See Pustoy v. State, 12 Ohio L. Abs. 560, 561 (Ct. App. 1932) where it is stated:
The nature of the charge permits wider latitude in the character of proof required to
support it than would be permitted upon a charge of other specific offenses such as rape
or assault with intent to rape or kill. One may be guilty of the offense of contributing
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For example, in People v. Lew, ° the defendant was acquitted of statutory
rape despite certain proof of engaging in intercourse with the minor but was
convicted of contributing to her delinquency, under equally certain proof that
the victim was a prostitute. The continued existence of contributing statutes
promotes such selective enforcement through recourse to the broad statutory
prohibitions. At least to the extent of this apparent overlap of criminal
offenses, there is no demonstrated need for contributing statutes.
While it appears that delinquency cannot be predicted to arise upon
the occurrence of any particular act committed in the presence of a child,
state courts, nevertheless, have retained assumptions adopted by the statutory
drafters that certain acts of adults cause or tend to cause delinquency. In
line with community standards for the assessment of such causes, the courts
and legislatures have left the determination to the jury as to whether the
particular conduct of an accused under the circumstances was a violation
of the contributing statute. Thus, broadly drawn contributing to delinquency
statutes enable both juvenile courts and courts of general criminal jurisdiction
to adjudge adults guilty of a violation of such statutes on the basis of what,
under traditional guidelines, could be considered as non-criminal conduct.
As a result, enforcement is generally more selective under the state
contributing statute than under other state penal statutes."' The zeal of the
prosecutor and the police as well as the sentiment of the community plays
a vital role in the determination of who is to be prosecuted under a
contributing statute. 2 Several writers have echoed the fear that a defendant
can be legally victimized by such statutes." Since the defendant's conduct may
have been founded upon good motives, the real victim in many instances
of the enforcement of contributing statutes is the accused. The defendant
may merely be a victim of circumstances while pursuing humanitarian rather
than criminal motives. For example, a school counselor faces the threat of
such a prosecution for providing birth control advice and birth control pills
to students;9" and, a minister for giving refuge to a troubled runaway. Given
the vagueness of the contributing statute, it is not difficult to perceive the
to the delinquency of a minor by conduct or a series of acts, the commission of no one
of which would in itself constitute a crime.
90 78 Cal. App. 2d 175, 177 P.2d 60 (1947).
91 See, e.g., State v. Suchy, 31 Ohio Misc. 265, 277 N.E.2d 459 (C.P. 1971) (contributing
statute not employed where minor is exposed to illegal acts for purposes of assisting police).
92 RuBiN, supra note 23, at 30, has suggested that "probably one reason why the laws are not
on their way out is that they are enforced only sporadically. If they were persistently
enforced their unjustified harshness would convince many that the laws should be repealed".
93See T. BURGUM & S. ANDERSON, TIE COUNSELOR AND THE LAW, 115 (1975); RuBIN,
supra note 23.
94 T. BURGUM & S. ANDERSON, THE COUNSELOR AND THE LAw, 115 (1975).
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possibility of an adult inadvertently crossing the bounds of permitted conduct.
Courts have consistently failed to make a subjective consideration as to
the nature of the victim of the contributing offense. Apparently, "it is not
what the behavior did to this particular child, but what it might conceivably
do to most children, or perhaps to some children, that makes it punishable."
95
At least one court has acknowledged that "an act which might lure one child
into the paths of sin might prove repulsive and abhorrent to another,
working out an exactly opposite effect.""6 Due to an inherent strong moral
character a minor may cling even more tenaciously to virtuous ways despite
or because of the repulsiveness of such an act. 7 Furthermore, if a child is
of such a tender age that the defendant's conduct is meaningless to the child,
the act may leave no lasting impression. 8
Generally the victim is viewed as a naive youth lead astray by the
actions and influence of an adult. By ignoring the minor's prior delinquency
or propensity toward delinquency, the courts may be convicting adults on the
basis of conduct induced by the minor. Since peer group relationships have
been acknowledged as a possible causative factor of delinquency,
9 a situation
can be envisioned in which a sixteen or seventeen year old induces a friend
of eighteen years or more to take part in a criminal act. Even if the act is
ordinarily non-criminal, but is one which may be prosecuted under a
contributing statute, the adult may be convicted for contributing to the
minor's delinquency despite the insignificant difference in their ages or
maturity and lack of any criminal intent on the part of the accused to corrupt
his younger friend.
The affect of contributing to delinquency statutes in deterring juvenile
delinquency appears to be insignificant. In an assessment of the contributing
statutes one investigator has emphasized: "They are too vague to deter acts
which they do not specify, and they are superfluous in deterring acts
represented elsewhere in the statute books."' 10 In a comprehensive ten year
study of the merit of prosecuting parents under contributing statutes, Judge
Paul W. Alexander of the Lucas County Domestic Relations and Juvenile
Court, Toledo, Ohio, found that a noticeable rise in delinquency was neither
affected nor counterbalanced by these prosecutions."
1 No evidence was found
95 Gies, supra note 1, at 66.
96 State v. Stone, 111 Ore. 227, 235, 226 P. 430, 433 (1924).
97 See, e.g., People v. McGougal, 74 Cal. App. 666, 241 P. 598 (1925).
98 See, e.g., People v. Gruhl, 320 Ill. App. 489, 51 N.E.2d 615 (1943) (minor was 3
years old).
9 9 An Ounce of Prevention, supra note 1, at 106 & n. 18.
100 Gies, supra note 1, at 80.
101 Alexander, What's this About Punishing Parents?, 12 FED. PROB. 23 (1948).
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that punishing parents had any affect whatsoever on curbing delinquency.
One can only hypothesize that similar results would be evident in the
records of other courts. Where the conduct proscribed under the contributing
statute is not only ordinarily non-criminal, but is also not clearly delineated
within the statute, criminal punishment fails to deter effectively similar
future conduct.
Several authorities in the juvenile justice area have proposed the repeal
of contributing statutes citing their potential for abuse.' °2 The Model Penal
Code has also disavowed the loosely drafted contributing to delinquency
statutes. As an alternative to contributing to delinquency statutes the
American Law Institute has proposed Model Penal Code Section 230.4.03
Unlike existing contributing statutes this Model Penal Code section provides:
A parent, guardian, or other person supervising the welfare of a
child under 18 commits a misdemeanor if he knowingly endangers the
child's welfare by violating a duty of care, protection or support.
The comment to the tentative draft of this proposed statute made
reference to the significance of the provision:
[I]ts significance lies as much in what it does not make criminal
as in what it does penalize. Notably, it will not be an offense under
this or any other Section of the Code to 'contribute to the delinquency'
or 'corrupt the morals of a child'....lo,
Although a specification of offenses is preferable, the Model Penal
Code provision provides an alternative to a complete enumeration of the
specific activities which may be deemed to constitute objectionable conduct
in relations with minors. By limiting the protection of minors to intentional
derelictions by adults of specific duties owed while supervising the welfare
of a minor, vague goals of the possible prevention of delinquency are
abandoned in favor of the present protection of the child's welfare. Offenses
not covered under the Model Penal Code provision could be prosecuted
under specific criminal statutes.
V. CONCLUSION
While the general purpose of contributing statutes may be considered
laudatory, the scope of the statutes encompasses in one category a variety
of possible acts which may constitute crimes only upon final determination
by a judge or jury. As evidenced herein, there exists a propensity for abuse
102 See RUBIN, supra note 23, ch. 2, Gies, supra note 1.
103 MODEL PENAL CODE § 230.4 (Proposed Official Draft, 1962).
104 MODEL PENAL CODE § 207.13, Comment (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959).
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in the application of contributing to delinquency statutes toward making
criminal, acts which are innocent in themselves. Judged as penal laws, the
contributing to the delinquency of minors statutes stretch the permissible
limits of due process guarantees. However, despite imprecise language and
a failure to enumerate types of behavior which could apprise or notify
one prior to the commission of an act that it may later be charged as criminal,
most states have continued to uphold such statutes against charges that they
are void for vagueness. Upon a simple reading of the statutes it is hard to
endorse the belief expressed by one court that such statutes "are sufficiently
certain and definite to apprise men of ordinary intelligence of the conduct
which the statute prohibits". 05 While prosecutions for contributing to
delinquency continue to arise inadvertently out of a variety of circumstances,
there remains a definite lack of uniformity of possible punishable acts. The
lack of notice provided by the statutes is justified by the state courts on the
basis that "in view of the diverse factors that enter into such cases, it becomes
a question of fact to be left to the jury ... "o0I As so aptly stated by the
United States Supreme Court, "well intentioned prosecutors and judicial
safeguards do not neutralize the vice of a vague law". 0 7
Therefore, legislative and judicial reappraisal of their state's contributing
to delinquency statute is mandated to assess: first, whether constitutional
requirements have been met; second, the impact such statutes have had as
a deterrent to delinquency; and third, whether a specific statutory language
is available which would detail and encompass the acts for which individuals
may be prosecuted under the contributing statute, through reference to court
cases.
In this manner, the particular contributing statute can be evaluated
in an effort to insure fair notice of what may be held to constitute offenses
in relationships with minors. Discarding the contributing statutes in favor
of specific legislation proscribing designated acts or at a minimum, enacting
legislation similar to Model Penal Code Section 230.4, would better insure
the protection of all parties, both the minor and the well intentioned adult.
GLENN W. SODEN
105 Brockmueller v. State, 86 Ariz. 82, 84, 340 P.2d 992, 994 (1959), cert. denied, 361
U.S. 913 (1959).
10 State v. Stone, 111 Ore. 227, 236, 226 P. 430 (1924).
10T Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 373 (1964).
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